Memory and the Everyday life in Fertile Memories

“The philosopher Leibniz showed that the world is made up of series which are composed and which coverage in a very regular way, according to ordinary laws. However the series and the sections are only apparent to us only in small sections, and in a disrupted or mixed up order, so that we believe in breaks, disparities and discrepancies as in things that are out of ordinary.” (Cinema 2, pg.14) Cinema has mainly been the action-image spectacle of extraordinary because of its use of breaks and discrepancies in recreation of real life. It has primarily depicted events discretely. However some filmmakers such as Ozu, and Michel khleifi in the case of The Fertile Memories (1980) have tried against that by raising the emphasis on the mundane everyday banality, along with using strategic cinematic techniques: Camera movements are minimum, and mainly in the form of slow panning shots. Close-ups and deep depth of field have been constantly used. Dissolves are abandoned in order to make room for the simple cut. Empty spaces (both exterior and interior) and silent moments; occupy a good amount of screen time. The montage is somewhat rhythmic with low tempo, creating a certain temporal calmness.

Also in search of a more continuous recollection, by a particular way of gluing the sound to image, Khleifi has tried in reducing the affect of discreteness of film. The sound often continues to the next shot, be it an absolutely different environment. Or sometimes what seems to be a voice over narration becomes the actual onscreen sound of the shot that follows. This perhaps has been an attempt in reproducing the “pure” memory. Deleuze writes on Bergson’s notion of memory: “On one hand the following moment always contains, over and above the proceeding one, the memory the latter has left it; on the other hand, the two moments contract or condense into each other since one has not yet disappeared when another appears. “ (Bergsonism, pg. 51) In The Fertile Memories, sound acts on a higher level, as a linkage that merges the images together. In overall, reproducing memory in a sense that each segment would contain the proceeding one, and would not necessarily disappear with the arrival of a segment that follows.

Therefore considering khleifi’s way of editing in creating a sense closer to pure memory, the importance given to the everyday banality, and also the singularity of the separate narrations of the two women, he’s approach to history can be viewed as a genealogical one. By showing the everyday life, Khleifi “reveals disparity and dispersions” of the identity of the women, which would have regularly been cut out.


References:
• Deleuze, Gilles. (1991). “Memory as Virtual Coexistence.” Bergsonism. New York: Zone Books.
• Deleuze, Gilles (1989). “Beyond the movement image.” Cinema 2 : The Time-Image. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
• Foucault, Michel (1984). “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.” The Foucault Reader. New York: Pantheon Books

Soundprints

In Soundprints a group of people whom are given wireless headphones and binaural microphones, get to walk together in the city. One of the prerequisites of the walk is the collective relation between individuals in the group. The wireless range of the equipment, limits each member to maintain certain proximity with the fellow walker. Therefore each member would determine his/her routes based on both sonic information that s/he receives from the fellow walker, and also a visual sense of closeness with the group. This makes the group an entity by itself that moves within the space, a whole (“le Tout”); a whole that transforms with the space, rather than translate in the space. An invisible qualitatively changing whole, rather than simply a shifting of positions in the space.

I think it would be appropriate at this stage to talk about the concept of multiplicity developed by Henri Bergson and Edmund Husserul; a concept which ought not to be confused with the traditional notion of multiple where there is a direct division between one and multiple. Bergsonian multiplicity, seeks to move away from this traditional division by conceiving a unity immanent to the system. To better understand the notion of multiplicity it is necessary to discuss its two types: quantitative multiplicity and qualitative multiplicity. A simple example for a quantitative multiplicity would be what Bergson supplies: a flock of sheep. They are all the same and of the same particularity of being sheep (homogenous), however each has a distinguishable singularity and spatial position. This spatial dispersion enables us to enumerate them, and sum them up into a quantitative whole.

On the other hand there is as well a qualitative multiplicity; a multiplicity that regards the qualities of different heterogeneous elements. Since this is harder to grasp I will provide two different examples, each to highlight a different aspect of a qualitative multiplicity. The first is the example of sympathy. When we sympathize we put ourselves in the place of others. In Time and Free Will Bergson explains in detail how sympathy consists of “transition from repugnance to fear, from fear to sympathy, and from sympathy itself to humility.” (Time and Free Will, pp. 18-19) Therefore sympathy consists of heterogeneity of feelings, which are continues with one another, and yet cannot be juxtaposed or said that they negate one another. Each feeling is heterogeneous to another, yet absolutely necessary to complete one another. The second example is the example of the water and oil, which is to underline movement within the multiplicity, and the relation of each heterogeneous element with each other and the whole. Imagine a drop of oil inside a bowl of water. The ‘water and oil’ is a qualitative multiplicity, since both of them are heterogeneous to one another, and perhaps even oppositional considering their reluctance to mix. Each has different viscosity and property, however they hold a continuous relation, and are in constant perturbation of one another, since they both have a kind of liquid quality. To think of the water and oil as a qualitative multiplicity is also to be able to examine them as one whole entity. No matter how distinct the water and oil are from each other, it would be a challenge to draw their boundaries with one another. So even though they are heterogeneous, they are as well one. In this context to study the movement of the oil in the water, would be to regard the transformation of water-oil. In other words when the oil moves from one point to another, it is not just the oil that is shifting its position in space, rather the whole multiplicity is going through a transformation. Each molecule of the water has to also change within a given duration, in order for the oil to move. Therefore in a qualitative multiplicity rather than translation of particulars, we have transformation of the whole (which consist of heterogeneous singulars.)

To think of the group as a Whole, is to think of the space as part of the group as well. To differentiate between body and space, is to consider their boundaries with each other. The only thing that separates our body from the space is our skin. Alan Watts writes: “although our bodies are bounded with skin, and we can differentiate between outside and inside, they cannot exist except in a certain kind of natural environment. So to describe myself in a scientific way, I must also describe my surroundings, which is a clumsy way getting around to the realization that you are the entire universe. However we do not normally feel that way because we have constructed in thought an abstract idea of our self." (The Book, Chapter 1) Therefore the question of our body-space multiplicity being heterogeneous is directly related to our perception of ourselves. If we remove the idea of self (or perhaps selves) from the context of the body then, as Watts mentions, the space-body boundary becomes a gray area that would result in a topological body that is in direct relation with the space. So as long as the notion of self and the possessive body is removed, the group (including land, space, exchanged sounds, and time) can be thought of as a qualitative multiplicity. In other words each component of the Whole can be considered a separate topological element that would hold a heterogeneity with others. However looking at the Whole or the multiplicity of these components they can only be functioning in unity once there exist a correct relation between one another.

In Soundprints, sound operates towards removing this idea of self. Erin Manning writes:
If my body is created through my movement toward you, there is no “self” to refer back to, only a proliferation of vectors of intensity that emerge through contact. This contact is not an end point; it is not a moment of arrival where something like two bodies “meeting” happens. It is far beyond tact. Rather, it is a signaling of a reaching that arrives, momentarily, only to have been arrived at, relationally, again. (Politics of Touch. pp 136)
Sound creates this contact. It forms the desire of reaching toward. But at the same time it prevents the moment of arrival. The bodies never meet. Sound holds the bodies in their potentiality. It creates bodies that are always beyond them-selves. (Politics of Touch. pp 136.) Sound becomes the ‘of body’ and ‘of space’ hybrid that unite different bodies, space, and time. It brings together all heterogeneous elements towards forming a qualitative multiplicity – towards a Whole.

If the group (including land, space, exchanged sounds, and time) is thought of as one unity, then the notion of bodies navigating within the space becomes absurd. There would be no such a thing as navigation, because the navigator and the space to navigate in are one thing. They transform as a whole. They become as a whole. The movement of bodies in the space, becomes a dance with the space. A dance with the land, where the bodies become the land, and the land becomes the bodies. It would no longer be about locating. The desire to locate and seek the destination, is replaced by the desire to simply experience. That is why it becomes a dance. The purpose is not to reach the end of the choreography. In fact there is no purpose, there is only the desire to experience, to transform with the whole (land, body, sound, space, time, experience), to become.

References:
- Bergson, Henri. (1913). Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. New York: Dover Publications, INC.
- Deleuze, Gilles. (1991). Bergsonism. New York: Zone Books.
- Manning, Erin. (2006). Politics of Touch. Minnesota: University Of Minnesota Press.
- Watts, Alan. The Book: On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are.
- (2008). Henri Bergson. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bergson/

Zizek, Casablanca and Post-Code Hollywood

Watch the Video Here


Slavoj Zizek is a Marxist/Lacanian psychoanalyst. His psychoanalytic observations of Cinema is very interesting and different. In this video he briefly talks about Casablanca, one of those mediocre Hollywood hits that to my opinion has been over-rated. He also approaches the Post-Code Hollywood censorship, on the level of its subconscious affect.

I really encourage you to check other Zizek videos on youtube. There are two full length features also called: the reality of the virtual and Zizek, that are really interesting.

Embodied Mind

short reflections on Varela, Thompson and Rosch's idea of cognitivism:

We find ourselves living in a world which has inherited most of its norms from the previously lived cultures which have established an evolving common sense, including our self- knowledge. Technology as an “amplifier” acts in transforming the social practices and making this knowledge possible.

Our minds operate by manipulation of symbols that represent behaviors and features of the world. This “process of symbols” is to a degree that we humans tend to mistaken representations with the actual events and object, while internally representing them. For instance we usually tend to confuse our names, our thought and the ideas of ourselves, with ourselves. Something which results in what Lacan calls “the big other” or what the authors call “separate subjective WE.” Again this internal representation of symbols depends a lot on our historically influenced minds.

Thinking With Somebody Else's Head

When I was back in Montreal, I discovered this podcast by a fellow called Richard Lloyd Jones.
I managed to Listen to several of his episodes before coming to Dubai, and they were really interesting. The guests whom are presented are very intellectual, and they usually share different point of view than that of those who are often invited to on-air radio station . It challeneges any subject that influences our view of the world: Science, philosophy, psychology, quantum physics, religion,...

Take a look at his blog and listen to some of the podcasts:
http://somebodyelseshead.blogspot.com/

Society of control vs. Disciplinary societies

Deleuze recognizes disciplinary societies as an ended system which has given its place to the society of control, a new intellectual way of applying control over the society. This happens according to Deleuze by blending what Foucault calls “closed environment”. Also other methods like specializing, dividualizing are key points in this process.Today every person has a personal password which is recognized by a machine; a machine that works with a program designed for dealing dividually with individuals.

Delueze's notion of the capitalism in the today’s society of control is also very interesting as he calls it capitalism for the product rather than capitalism for the production, as most of the products are made in the third world where there is cheap labor. And this is why marketing have become the core of the financial society, to an extend where Toni Morrison recognize Fascism a marketing for power rather than just an ideology. By making people paying their tax and debts, today were are enclosed to these methods of control through power where we are consumers in form of numbers and statistics.

Virilio and Minh-Ha on Reality and representation

Virilio tries to express reality through speed of light and time. How the speed of light affects our notion of reality, the fact that we perceive every incidence not at the very moment it occurs; the idea of trans-appearance, and how time plays an important role in our perception rather than the space. Therefore the speed of light which is related to time is more important than the light itself in the way we conceive the reality of appearances. And that is why the image is what Virilio calls shadow of time, referring to Plato.

Virilio also cites Walter Benjamin’s idea of “aura” and discusses how technology made us so close to the things that we are no longer affected by them. We are trying our best to develop systems of control where we are able to do everything simultaneously without necessary being present in different spaces, and here is the notion of mobility which doesn’t necessarily refers to space.

Minh-Ha argues how we are subjective and the technology is absolutely objective; that is why when we hide technology as much as possible, the images we are presenting become far more detached from the reality.

Discussing Minh-Ha, why do we think that the reality is neutral? Can the reality itself be biased as well? Reality, Being untouched and raw whether it may seem biased, is neutral.

Also, if “a bad shot is guaranteed of authenticity" then is a beautiful piece of art, even if it is reflecting reality, always a lie?

Image, Technology and Political Economy

With the emergence of new technologies and the developments in reproduction, “Image” acquired a whole new definition, which no longer maintained the notion of its physical component, and considered the mass production means.

Reproduction has always existed, but with new technologies it has entered a new level. Digital imaging, along with Internet, has created a shift in the visual culture, by providing the easiest reproduction and access tools. A reproduction, no matter how accurate and perfect it is, comparing to its original, lacks an element which Walter Benjamin calls “aura.” The fact that the reproduced image is no longer present in time and space, specially in the digital world where it may even not have a physical existence. (Benjamin, 50)

One of things that make the original, for instance a painting, valuable is its uniqueness. The “aura” of the original, what gives it its cult value, is its oneness, and also the phenomena of “distance.”(Benjamin, 52) Mainly due to its inaccessibility, the original always tends to keep this “distance” with its viewer, even though s/he might be physically close to it.

But with the digital technology where the copy is absolutely identical with the original, the original becomes a copy where at the same time all copies can be considered original. On the top of that is Internet where all these originals are distributed, and can be accessed easily. So the question is that in such a system, does there still exist a notion of “aura.”

The other thing, that has been redefined frequently, after the appearance of digital imaging and Internet, is copyright. Once protecting the uniqueness of an image, now it has entered a whole new level. Images can easily be stored in personal computers and there are such a great amount of users that tracking everybody down, is impossible. The new technology enables the masses to get what they want without the involvement of any power structure or economic corporation. It has created a situation where the visuals can reach anybody in anywhere without passing through the filtering process of capital, and propaganda. It is for this reason that countries like China or Iran limited their people’s access to Internet.